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Determinants of Different Accounting Methods Choice in Tanzania: A 
Positive Accounting Theory Approach 
1.0 Introduction and motivation 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the factors which influence the 
choices of accounting policies by managers of companies in Tanzania. Previous 
studies show that managers may choose income increasing or income decreasing 
accounting policies in reporting financial results (Beattie et al., 1994; Astami & 
Tower, 2006; Bowen & Shores, 1995).These studies also examine a number of 
factors that influence the managers’ incentives for accounting choice. However, 
there are reasons to suggest that more research is required. First, most of these 
studies have tended to focus on firms in the developed countries (see Inoue & 
Thomas, 1996; Cullinan, 1999; Lin & Peasnell, 2000) and in countries in the Asia-
Pacific region (Rahman & Scapens, 1988; Tawfik &, 2006; Astami & Tower, 
2009). Consequently, there are no studies that have examined managerial 
accounting methods choices in the context of Africa. The findings from developed 
countries and the Asia-Pacific region may not be relevant to Africa because the 
environment is different, for example, the stage of economic development is very 
low, financial markets are inefficient and underdeveloped, and regulatory 
framework for accounting is weak and compliance with accounting rules is low 
(see Okeahalam, 2004). This study is the first attempt to examine what motivates 
managers to choose one accounting method over another in an African country-
Tanzania. 
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A distinct characteristic of the Tanzanian environment, which makes an 
investigation of accounting policy choices particularly appealing, is the adoption 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) with effect from 1st July 
2004. Despite adopting IFRSs, companies are still allowed to apply local 
accounting standards known as Tanzania Financial Accounting Standards 
(TFASs). These include TFAS 12, Directors Report; TFSA 23, Accounting for 
VAT and TFAS 24, Public Sector Financial Reporting. Generally, companies 
listed on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange use IFRSs in reporting their financial 
results. Where there is no equivalent or counterpart IFRS in reporting a particular 
item, the few retained TFASs are applied. However there is an apparent lack of 
clarity as to which accounting standards should be used since the Companies Act 
(2002) is silent. The Capital Markets and Securities Authority (CMSA) requires 
brokers, dealers and investment advisors to use TFASs and listed companies opt 
to use IFRSs (World Bank, 2005). In this situation of mixed and incompatible 
regulations, managers have the discretion over what accounting standards to apply 
in the preparation of financial statements without falling foul of the regulations. 
Our main objective in this study is to assess the factors that influence managers in 
choosing accounting policies. 
Second, in a review article, Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) criticise 
previous studies for their focus on single accounting policy choices and propose 
that research should consider examining several accounting method choices 
simultaneously as in Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) to improve understanding. 
Missonier (2004) also concludes that although an impressive amount of empirical 
research on the motivational factors of the choice of accounting methods has been 
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undertaken, the majority of this research focuses on a single, isolated accounting 
practice. This assumes that the accounting choices of managers are independent of 
each other, which is not appropriate. The rationale for examining multiple 
accounting choices is that if managers are bent on accelerating or delaying the 
reporting of income, it would be more reasonable to expect them to do so by 
taking into account the accumulated effects of all their accounting procedures. The 
logic is easily understood from the viewpoint of accounting method strategies. In 
this study we use a number of accounting policy choices that managers may make. 
In examining managers’ accounting policy choice, we apply the positive 
accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) as in other previous studies 
(Beattie et al., 1994; Astami & Tower, 2006). The basic assumption of positive 
accounting theory is that managers (as agents) are rational individuals who are 
concerned with furthering their own self-interests. Consistent with this, we assume 
that the motivating factor influencing managers' selection of particular accounting 
policies is the maximization of their utility. Our motivation is therefore to gather 
evidence about the factors which influence managerial action. The accumulation 
of evidence from such studies facilitates the development of a theory to explain 
accounting practice (Beattie et al., 1994). We are also motivated by the fact that 
accounting information is used by rational investors in their investment decisions, 
but usefulness of the information to investors depends on how managers or 
preparers behave. Managers can provide information which misleads capital 
markets to simply meet their own self- interests (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986, 
quoted in Mouck, 1990). These behaviours, if not enlightened, may lead to 
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reduced value relevance of financial statements or poor quality financial 
statements, hence the misallocation of investor funds. 
Using panel data of 60-firm years obtained from the annual reports of the 
15 companies listed on the Dar es Salaam stock exchange (DSE), this study found 
that company size, Internal financing, labour force and the proportion of non-
executive directors as the main determinants of the choice of accounting methods. 
The results of this study are important to the IASB and accounting regulators in 
Tanzania, in the determination of the flexibility of accounting practices as well as 
the disclosures required to aid the users of financial statements. The study is also 
important to investors in developing countries, who must interpret financial 
statement numbers while making investment decisions. Furthermore, the study 
contributes to our understanding of what determines the choice of accounting 
methods in developing economies, especially Tanzania. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: The second section 
reviews the related literature and develops the hypotheses. The third section 
presents the research design. The findings are presented in section 4 while, the 
conclusions are presented in section 5. 
2.0 Literature Review and Hypotheses development 
2.1 Prior studies 
Positive accounting theory, which is associated with Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986), assumes that the market is efficiency such that the market 
participants will see through observable smoothing devices such as accounting 
policy choice. Holthausen (1990) identifies three overlapping perspectives on 
accounting choice. These are opportunistic behaviour, efficient contracting, and 
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information perspectives. The two contracting perspectives (efficient contracting 
and opportunistic behaviour) are based on the existence of contracts which rely on 
accounting numbers. 
Managers are assumed to maximize their own wealth in the opportunistic 
behaviour setting, which depends on performance-related cash bonuses, 
employment risk arising from the possibility of company failure or takeover, and 
the firm's share value. Managers' holdings of shares and share options and through 
the effect on the value of their human capital affect the share value wealth. It 
follows, therefore, that managers have incentives to make choices which 
maximize the firm's direct cash flows and hence firm value (Beattie et al., 1994). 
Where accounting choices do not have a direct cash flow effect, managerial 
incentives arise. This occurs, for example, where accounting choices impact on 
share prices via their effect on the firm's expected political costs (a function of 
reported profits) or debt default/renegotiation costs. It is thus predicted that the 
managers of firms with high political costs will select current income-reducing 
accounting methods and that the managers of firms with high agency costs of 
equity and debt will choose current income-increasing methods. In the efficient 
contracting setting, contracts which minimize agency costs may encourage 
earnings management. The contracts are, nevertheless, efficient as they result in 
firm value maximization. In practice, it is difficult to distinguish hypotheses based 
on this perspective from those generated in the opportunistic behaviour setting 
(Beattie et al., 1994; Florou, 2004). 
A number of studies draw from the positive accounting theory and 
examine managerial incentives for accounting policy choice. Cotter (1999) and 
5 
Gupta (1995) show that managerial incentives to choose accounting policies 
derive from the relationships among a corporation’s stakeholders, including 
managers, stockholders and creditors. These studies have generally found that the 
presence of bonus plans, restrictive debt covenants, and political costs affect 
accounting procedure choices. Yet, their results afford only partial insights in our 
understanding of managers’ motives since they focus on a single accounting 
choice at a time. Missioner (2004) identifies bank and private loans, ownership 
dilution, labour force and managers’ own compensations as significant factors 
influencing the accounting method choice of Swiss managers. The study found 
size of a firm and leverage as insignificant in the Swiss context. In contrast to 
Missonier’s study, Inoue and Thomas (1996) found that the size of a firm and 
leverage are major factors shaping Japanese managers’ accounting choice 
methods. The study identifies other factors as taxation, foreign political costs and 
a firm’s ability to finance its operations internally. 
According to Beattie et al. (1994), firms tend to choose accounting 
methods to smooth income. In smoothing their income, managers choose 
accounting methods to increase or decrease income to meet their own interests. 
The study identified factors which cause managers to choose extraordinary items 
to smooth income in the UK context. These are accounting risk, market risk, 
agency costs, political costs, ownership structure, industry, dividend payout and 
managerial share options. Of these factors, accounting risk, agency costs, 
ownership structure and dividend payout are significant in explaining choice of 
extraordinary items by UK managers. Market risk, political costs, industry and 
managerial share options are not significant. This is in contrast with Inoue and 
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Thomas (1996), where size as a measure of political cost is significant though the 
results in case of share options are in line with bonus plan in the Japanese context 
and contradicts managerial compensation in the Swiss context. Basing their 
research on a single industry, Aitken and Loftus (2009), identify compensation 
plans, debt and political costs to explain managers’ accounting policy choice in 
Australia. Only compensation plan is found to be significant while debt and 
political costs are not. This study rejects the political and debt hypothesis which 
describes the positive accounting theory proved in the US since the studies by 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986 & 1990). Astami and Tower (2006) investigated 
four key accounting-policy disclosures in the 2000/2001 annual reports of 442 
listed companies in the Asian pacific Region. The results of their study indicate 
that companies that pursue income-increasing accounting techniques in their 
aggregate accounting policies are characterised by lower financial leverage, lower 
owner concentration and higher investment opportunity sets. Furthermore, they 
provided empirical evidence that the variations of management’s choice of 
accounting policies can be explained by the country of reporting as well as certain 
firm specific variables. Their findings differ from those of studies done in 
developed countries (Cullinan and Knoblett, 1994; Bowen et al., 1995 and 
Missonier, 2004), which have reported that high levered firms pursue accounting 
policies that accelerate the reporting of income. Tawfik (2006) investigated the 
variables affecting both single policy and portfolio strategies accounting choices 
in Saudi Arabia. The study found strong evidence to support that accounting 
choices in Saudi Arabia are not affected by firm specific factors such as size, 
leverage, or ownership concentration. We however observe that, unlike in 
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Tanzania, IFRSs are not permitted in Saudi Arabia. Rahman and Scapens (1988) 
questioned the universality of the proposition that political costs (size) are a major 
influencing factor in accounting policy choice. In their Bangladesh study, they 
found evidence suggesting that multinational corporations do not consistently use 
income reducing policies. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
In line with other previous studies, we develop the hypotheses by drawing from 
the positive accounting theory. In this context, we argue that managers adopt 
accounting methods in response to debt covenant constraints, political costs, and 
increase their compensation. Hence, we examine the effect of leverage, company 
size, ownership dilution, labour force, proportion of non-executive directors and 
reliance on internal financing. We only focus on these factors because of they are 
more applicable in the specific context of the Tanzanian economic and 
institutional environment. This environment differs from that of the USA, Japan, 
UK, and Switzerland, more so regarding the importance of banks in the firm’s 
external financing. This may be due to weak capital markets in Tanzania and 
hence a heavy reliance on bank loans (DSE Handbook, 2008). We are also 
restricted by the small sample size in this study owing to the small number of 
listed companies on the DSE. 
2.2.1 Leverage 
Inoue and Thomas (1996) have shown that owner-managers have incentives to 
liquidate the assets of the company in the form of dividends and leave the debt 
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holders with nothing but the shell of the company. However, a rational market for 
debt will price the debt accordingly and incorporate debt covenants into loan 
agreements to protect themselves. For example, debt covenants may restrict the 
payment of dividends at certain income levels. Prior literature links debt and 
accounting policy choice because debt covenants are usually based on reported 
accounting numbers and a violation of the debt covenants imposes costs on the 
company. Bowen et al. (1995) explain that managers seeking to reduce debt 
covenant costs may strive to adopt a set of accounting methods which enable them 
to report favourable financial statements in terms of creditworthiness. In addition, 
managers may try to improve the firm’s financial flexibility in order to prevent 
them from reporting an “image of financial distress” (Easton, Eddy & Trevor, 
1993). These considerations become more relevant as the company experiences 
financial debt increases, i.e. a higher total of financial debt over total assets 
(Cullinan & Knoblett, 1994; Piot, 2001 Zimmerman, 1986). According to the 
theory of accounting choices, to reduce the debt contracting costs, owner-
managers have incentives to offer debt covenants which restrict some of their 
actions. 
Despite the above arguments, Astami and Tower have found evidence 
suggesting that lower financial leverage is associated with income-increasing 
accounting techniques. We however observe that most of the countries surveyed 
in their study do not permit the use of IFRSs. In the context of Tanzania, 
companies rely on bondholders and banks for financing (DSE Handbook, 2008). 
Given the reliance on debt, managers should have incentives to choose income 
increasing accounting policies to ensure that they abide by the debt covenants 
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imposed by bondholders and banks and avoid renegotiation costs (Inoue & 
Thomas, 1996; Beatty & Weber, 2003). We therefore hypothesise the following: 
H1: The company's leverage ratio is significantly and positively associated with 
the manager’s use accounting methods that accelerate the reporting of income. 
2.2.2 Company size 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) note that political scrutiny is greater for large 
companies than for smaller companies. Prior studies have commonly used 
comapny size to represent political costs because there is a perception that large 
companies are subject to intense scrutiny, especially if they are reporting huge 
profits. These political costs may take the form of state interventions (via 
legislation, regulations) but also retaliations from unions and customers that may 
result in opportunity costs (i.e. abandoning profitable investments). The visibility 
of large companies, especially in terms of available wealth, tends more easily to 
attract the attention of numerous stakeholders, including elected representatives 
(and the electorate), employees, customers and competitors. As a result, managers 
of large companies may be inclined to select accounting methods that delay the 
reporting of income to reduce these political costs (Missonier, 2004). However 
Rahman and Scapens (1988) have questioned the universal application of the 
political cost theory. Tawfik (2006) and Astami and Tower (2006) also found no 
evidence to support that size influences accounting policy choices in Saudi Arabia 
and the Asian Pacific region respectively. 
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In developing countries like Tanzania, large companies are often accused 
of exploiting the general public and the country’s resources, especially 
multinational companies and are likely to be heavily regulated. Hence reporting 
huge profits might attract significant consequences from politics. However, it is 
also possible in Tanzania, as in most other African states, that large companies are 
political connected (Mangena, Tauringana and Chamisa, 2010). Such political 
connection implies that political costs relating to reporting huge profits may not be 
an important issue since managers will be protected by influential politician to 
whom they are connected. Moreover, since governments of developing countries 
like Tanzania encourage companies to participate in economic development, state 
interventions may not materialise and therefore we make no directional prediction. 
Hence, we hypothesise the following: 
H2: Company size is significantly associated with the adoption of accounting 
methods that decrease reported income. 
2.2.3 Labour Force intensity 
Employees and/or unions (i.e. its labour force) may influence managers to avoid 
potential political costs. For example, strikes such as those by Tanzania Railways 
Limited (TRL) and National Microfinance Bank (NMB) employees in the year 
2008 over demands for higher wages and salaries (with the employees claiming 
that the companies were generating a lot of income yet their earnings remained 
low) are kept to a minimum. The goal of maximizing employee wealth generally 
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takes the form of wage demands associated with the companies’ economic rents. 
Given that economic rent is generally correlated with the companies’ profits 
(Elias, 1990; Liberty & Zimmerman, 1986), employees are likely to focus on 
reported earnings. Wage increases can result in a substantially reduced 
shareholder wealth. This provides managers with the incentive to limit the 
intensity of wage demand (and thus the intensity of conflicts) by selecting 
accounting methods which delay the reporting of income. 
The relevance of this accounting policy will increase as the bargaining 
power of employees increases such as with union presence and/or in a labour 
intensive industry. The few studies that examine the effect of labour pressures on 
the process of making accounting decisions consider the level of unionization as a 
good indicator of employees’ power of negotiation (Cullinan & Knoblett, 1994; 
Liberty & Zimmerman, 1986). Since this information may not be available for 
Tanzania corporations, we use, as in Depoers (2000), the ratio of salaries plus 
social charges to sales as a proxy of labour force power. 
H3: Labour force intensity is significantly and negatively associated with 
accounting methods that accelerate the reporting of income. 
2.2.4 Ownership Dilution 
Managers of companies with a high ownership dilution (i.e. where the percentage 
of the voting rights held by the principal shareholders is low) may experience 
more discretionary power especially in publishing information on its performance 
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(Hall, 1993). It is therefore highly probable that in companies where the 
ownership dilution is high, managers will choose accounting methods that 
accelerate the reporting of income to increase their own compensation. In doing 
so, they may convince shareholders that the company’s performance is 
satisfactory, especially where bonus agreements may leave some discretion to the 
owners to determine the amount to be paid to the executives. They may increase 
the value of their human capital by developing a reputation for professional 
competence as well as by reporting a flattering image of the firm (Missonier, 
2004). In the Asia Pacific region, Astami and Tower (2006) found that lower 
levels of ownership concentration are significantly associated with companies that 
pursue income increasing accounting techniques. We measure ownership 
concentration on the basis of the number of blockholders owning 5% or more of 
the company’s share capital. In this respect, when the number of blockholders is 
large, ownership dilution is considered low and managers’ discretion to adopt 
income increasing policies may be curtailed. We therefore hypothesise that: 
H4: Ownership dilution is significantly and negatively associated with accounting 
methods that accelerate the reporting of income. 
2.2.5 Internal Financing 
Companies can use different forms of finance to fund their operations: debt, issue 
shares or use retained earnings. A low level of retained earnings would be 
indicative of a company which relies more on external financing (debt or equity) 
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and distributing most of its profits as dividends. On the other hand a high 
proportion of retain earnings, may be an indication that the company is not 
distributing most of its earnings to the shareholders. Waweru, Gelinas and Uliana 
(2009) have argued that emerging economy market stocks are more risky when 
compared to stocks in developed markets. Given this, shareholders may therefore 
prefer dividends to capital gains in emerging markets, such as Tanzania. Failure 
by manager’s to pay dividends may send the wrong information signal to the 
shareholders. In order to reduce asymmetric information costs, companies relying 
more on internal financing (retained earnings) are more likely to choose income 
decreasing accounting procedures in an attempt to reduce the amount of dividend 
to enable them to invest the retained earnings in new projects. However, using 
more external finance, they are more likely to use income increasing accounting 
methods to signal their ability to pay interest on debt as well as to attract new 
investors. 
H5: The proportion of retained earnings to net assets is significantly and 
negatively associated with the selection of accounting methods that increase 
reported income. 
2.2.6 Proportion of non-executive directors 
The objective of corporate governance is to realize shareholders’ long-term value 
while taking into account the interests of other stakeholders. Effective corporate 
governance and related accountability mechanisms are presumed to mitigate 
conflicts of interest and provide reasonable assurance that each party observes 
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certain behavioural norms. One might expect that accounting would be well 
equipped to examine and prescribe improvements in accountability among agents 
in capitalist settings. The board of directors plays a key role in accountability, 
with the non-Executive directors having the most crucial role. Non-executive 
directors’ role is to ensure that managers are accountable to the shareholders and 
that shareholders’ interests are protected. According to Shapiro (2006), a higher 
proportion of non-executive in the board may increase controls on self-interested 
managers. Given that the role of the board is to protect shareholders’ interests, 
their monitoring activities should curtail managers’ self-value maximising actions. 
Therefore, we hypothesise the following: 
H6: Managers of companies with greater proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board are likely to choose income decreasing accounting policies. 
3.0 Research methods 
3.1 Sample and data source 
Quantitative methods are employed to examine the relationships between the 
independent variables (leverage, company size, labour force, ownership dilution, 
internal financing and proportion of non-executive directors) and dependent 
variable (income strategy, measured on the basis of multiple accounting policies). 
The data is drawn from annual reports of all the fifteen companies listed on the 
DSE (see Appendix 1 for the list of companies). The data collected is for a 4-year 
period from year 2005 when Tanzania effectively adopted IFRSs to the year ended 
2008, which result in 60-firm years. The design is chosen because the population 
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is small and the use of panel data increases the number of observations, thus 
allowing meaningful statistical analysis. Where information was not available in 
annual reports, data was obtained from the companies’ websites, DSE or Capital 
Markets and Securities Authority (CMSA). In order to calculate values of 
variables to test the hypotheses, directors’ report, profit and loss account, balance 
sheet and notes to the accounts were all read. 
3.2 Income strategy measurement 
To measure income strategy (our dependent variable), we consider a company’s 
set of accounting choices as a single comprehensive decision as in Bowen et al. 
(1995) and Inoue & Thomas (1996). Only accounting policies that are disclosed in 
the company’s annual report are selected. The accounting policies are classified as 
either income increasing or income decreasing and are drawn from from the major 
accounting policies disclosed as part of the notes to the financial statements. We 
identified eleven relevant policies that can affect income (Table 1). The effect of 
accounting method on income or income strategy depends on measurements and 
recognition of a standard. 
Table 1: Selected Accounting policies and effect on income 
Policy Income Decreasing Income Increasing 
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Depreciation (DP) 
Retirement Allowance (RA) 
Marketable Securities (MS) 
Freehold land & buildings 
(L&B) 
Inventory (IVT) 
Employee benefit (EB) 
Property, plant & equipment 
(PPE) 
Goodwill (GWL) 
Intangible assets-software 
(IAS) 
Investment Property (IP) 
Leasing (LEAS) 
Accelerated 
Lump sum 
Fair value 
Revaluation 
Weighted Average 
Cost 
Expensed 
Revaluation 
Revaluation 
Fair value 
Fair value 
Sum-of-digits method 
Straight line 
Annual income 
Cost 
Cost 
FIFO 
Liability (paid in 
future) 
Cost 
Cost 
Cost 
Cost 
Actuarial method 
We define income strategy as a portfolio or combination of accounting policies 
which may increase or decrease reporting income (Missonier, 2004; Inoue & 
Thomas, 1996; Zmijewski & Hagerman, 1981). The income strategy as a variable 
is the ratio of the number of income increasing accounting policies divided by the 
total number of accounting policies used by a company (i.e. income increasing 
plus income decreasing). The denominator varies or changes depending on the 
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total number of relevant accounting policies. In measuring the income strategy we 
assume that the effects on income of all eleven accounting methods listed in Table 
1 are equal. This is consistent with Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) who show 
that attaching weights to accounting policies in income strategy models does not 
significantly change the results. 
3.3 Model specification 
Following our hypotheses development in Section 2.2 above, we specify the 
following ordinary least squares OLS) regression model: 
INCOME STRATEGY = α 0 + α 1 LEVER + α 2 SIZE+ α 3 LABFORCE - α 4 
ODILUTION+ α 5 INTERFIN +α 6 PROPNED +ε 
Where: 
INCOME STRATEGY = percentage of the accounting strategy choices that 
accelerates income (number of accounting methods 
accelerating income divided by total accounting methods). 
SIZE = Company size measured as the log of total assets collected 
from the annual reports at the end of the financial year end 
LEVER = Leverage ratio measured as total long term debt scaled with 
total book value of equity, both collected at the financial year 
end. 
LABFORCE = Labour force intensity, measured as the total labour charges 
scaled by the total annual turnover for the company 
18 
ODILUTION = Ownership dilution, measured as the number of blockholders 
with shareholdings of 5% or more. 
INTERFIN = Internal financing, defined as the percentage of appropriated 
retained earnings scaled by the net assets 
PROPNED= Proportion of non-executive directors, measured as the 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
4.0 Results 
In this section we present the results of the regression analysis. We first report the 
descriptive statistics and correlation results in Section 4.1. This is followed in 
Section 4.2 by a presentation of the regression results. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Table 2 above presents a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent 
and independent variables. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
Income strategy 
Firm size 
Mean 
.710 
25.463 
Median 
.700 
25.330 
Std Dev 
.130 
1.938 
Min 
.500 
21.020 
Max 
1.000 
28.870 
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Leverage ratio 
Labour force 
Ownership dilution 
Proportion of NEDS 
Internal financing 
2.925 
.113 
2.733 
.763 
.453 
.775 
.088 
2.000 
.820 
.381 
3.743 
.072 
1.287 
.182 
.353 
.000 
.002 
1.00 
.270 
.000 
15.630 
.370 
6.00 
1.000 
.970 
The table shows that the mean income strategy is 71.0%. This suggests that listed 
companies in Tanzania adopt more income increasing accounting policies than 
income decreasing accounting policies. This is consistent with positive accounting 
theory and agency theory which argues that managers choose accounting methods 
to maximize their utility. We, therefore view these findings as a reflection of 
managerial opportunism and weak corporate governance mechanisms. Even 
though the percentage of non-executive directors is very high at 76.28%, the non-
executive directors may not be knowledge about the company’s business to 
monitor managers effectively. As noted by DSE Handbook (2008), companies in 
Tanzania rely heavily on debt-financing. The mean leverage ratio of 2.93 means 
that the amount of debt is more than doubles that of equity. However, there seems 
to be high investment of retained earnings by the companies. The mean internal 
financing is about 45.32% of the total net assets and this is significant, suggesting 
that a significant amount of profits is distributed as dividends. 
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The Pearson correlations are presented in Table 3. We use the correlation 
matrix to determine whether the independent variables are highly correlated. 
Table 3 shows that there is little correlation among most of the independent 
variables as the highest correlation is 0.633 is less the benchmark of 0.7, 
suggesting that the problem of multicollinearity is not serious (Tibachnick and 
Fidel, 1996) 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix for the Independent Variables 
Variable 
Income 
Size 
Lev 
LabForce 
ODilution 
Propned 
InterFin 
Income 
1.000 
.123 
.023 
-.278** 
-.144 
-.633*** 
.052 
Size 
1.000 
579*** 
.271** 
-.184 
.266** 
-.046 
Lev 
1.000 
.564*** 
.230 
.077 
-.267** 
LabForce 
1.000 
.111 
-.009 
-.238* 
ODilution 
1.000 
.063 
-.165 
Propned 
1.000 
.282** 
InterFin 
1.000 
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
4.2 Multiple regression results and discussion 
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: OLS regression results of income accounting method strategies (N=60) 
Variable 
Constant 
Company size 
Leverage 
Labour force 
Ownership Dilution 
Propned 
Internal finance 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F-value 
Coeff. 
.544 
.025 
.006 
-.749 
.003 
-.572 
.090 
SE 
.176 
.007 
.004 
.162 
.009 
.058 
.030 
.699 
.665 
20.490*** 
Beta 
.375 
.170 
-.427 
.026 
-.822 
.249 
t-statistics 
3.095*** 
3.515*** 
1.420 
-4.625*** 
.304 
-9.797*** 
2.983*** 
VIF 
2.008 
2.525 
1.499 
1.322 
1.238 
1.228 
***,**,*Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
As the table shows, the regression model has significant explanatory power. The 
adjusted R2 of the model is 0.665 and the F-value of 20.490 is significant at the 
1% level or better. The adjusted R2 of the model indicates that the model explains 
66.5% of the variation in the income strategy measure. 
In terms of the explanatory factors, we find that leverage is not 
significantly related to the choice of accounting policies, although the direction of 
the coefficient is positive as predicted. However, the hypothesis that there is a 
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significant relationship between leverage and accounting choice (H1) is therefore 
rejected. This is consistent with studies done by Aitken and Loftus (2009) in 
Australia, Missonier (2004) in Switzerland, Tawfik (2006) in Saudi Arabia and 
Rahman and Scapens (1988) in Bangladesh, who found that leverage is not a 
factor in explaining the choice of accounting methods. However the findings are 
not consistent with those of Astami and Tower (2006) who found that lower 
leverage levels were significantly associated with the choice of income-increasing 
accounting choices in the Asian Pacific region. Our results suggest that the level 
of debt does not influence the choice of accounting policies in Tanzania. This may 
reflect the close relationship that may exist between managers and their debt-
holders, especially banks, to the extent that debt covenants are perhaps not as 
important. 
Company size (SIZE) is positive and significantly related to the choice of 
accounting methods, hence the second hypothesis (H2) of a significant association 
is supported. The positive relationship between income strategy and company size 
contradicts previous studies which showed a negative relationship (e.g., Christie, 
1990; Missonier, 2004) and no relationship (e.g., Tawfik, 2006; Astami & Tower, 
2006). This research finds that large companies choose income increasing 
methods probably due to the Tanzanian government policy encouraging 
companies to participate in economic development. Given that the Tanzanian 
government support companies’ role in economic development and the lack of 
laws on social responsibility, political pressures resulting from increasing 
profitability may be limited. In this context, companies may not consider adopting 
increasing income accounting policies costly in terms of political scrutiny. This 
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contradicts the argument that larger companies fear government action, especially 
if their profits are large, and therefore tend to delay profits (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986). 
Our results also show a negative and significant relationship between 
labour force intensity and income strategy, thus consistent with hypothesis 3 (H3). 
This implies that managers may employ decreasing income accounting policies to 
diminish the intensity of wage demands and reduce conflicts between unions and 
management. The dilution of ownership is not associated with accounting policy 
choice, thus our hypothesis 4 is not supported. Our findings are inconsistent with 
those of Astami and Tower (2006), who reported that companies that pursued 
income increasing accounting techniques were characterised by lower levels of 
owner concentration. The non-significance of this variable may reflect the general 
issue in most African countries where shareholders, especially the minority, have 
very little control over managers. The implication is that no shareholder pressure 
is anticipated by managers whether they report high or lower profits. 
We find that there is a significant positive relationship between internal 
financing and income strategy, thus our hypothesis 5 (H5) is not supported. The 
result contradicts the study by Missonier (2004) which found that at higher level 
of external financing (low level of internal financing), managers choose income 
increasing procedures. This shows that the higher the level of internal financing, 
the more managers will choose income increasing procedures. It is possible that 
managers may have incentives to signal a stronger financial performance to justify 
their ability to finance the costs of borrowing and reduce the pressure to raise 
finance from the market and dilute earnings. 
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Finally, the relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors 
and income strategy is negative and significant, thus hypothesis 6 (H6) is 
supported. These results suggest that when the proportion of non-executive 
directors is greater, managers are unlikely to choose income increasing accounting 
policies. The implication of this finding is that non-executive directors in 
Tanzanian companies are effective monitors of managers, and act in the best 
interests of shareholders. 
5.1 Conclusions 
This research examines the determinants of managers’ accounting methods choice 
for 15 Tanzania companies that are quoted on the DSE from 2005 to year ended 
2008. We draw from positive accounting theory and examined whether firm size, 
leverage, internal financing, proportion of non-executive directors, ownership 
dilution, and labour force intensity influence the manager’s choice of accounting 
policy. We find no relation between leverage and accounting policy choice. The 
results show, contrary to the political cost hypothesis, that there is a positive 
relationship between income strategy and company size, indicating that larger 
companies are more likely to adopt income increasing accounting methods. 
Labour force intensity is found to be negatively related to income strategy, 
suggesting that labour intensive companies choose income delaying accounting 
policies, perhaps to avoid pressure from workers and labour unions demanding 
high salaries and wages. The relation between the proportion of non-executive 
directors and income strategy is negative, suggesting that non-executive directors 
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curtail the use of income increasing accounting policies. This seems to suggest 
that non-executive directors are effective monitors of managerial opportunistic 
behaviours. Finally, we find that companies that rely on internal financing choose 
income increasing methods so that they can retain more and show their 
shareholders that they are profitable. 
This study makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, it is the 
first study to examine the factors that influence the choice of accounting methods 
in Africa, and in Tanzania, in particular. Second, the paper introduces the effect of 
board composition (measured as the proportion of non-executive directors) as a 
new factor that influences the choice of accounting policies. No previous study 
has examined this variable in the context of managerial accounting choice. Third, 
our study demonstrates that there may be behavioural differences between 
managers of developed countries and their peers in a developing nation such as 
Tanzania. For example, the differences in some of our results to prior research 
suggest that the economic, social and political differences may be affecting 
managers’ behaviour in decision making. For example, whilst studies in 
developed countries report that large companies and highly leverage companies 
adopt income decreasing and increasing methods, respectively, in Tanzania, large 
companies adopt increasing income policies, whilst the level of debt does affect 
accounting methods choice. This seems to suggest that political costs are not a 
major issue for managers in developing countries. Thus, the results of this study 
cast doubt on the reliability of political cost hypothesis. 
Finally, the findings of this study have policy implications for IASB and 
African accounting regulators. Allowing companies to choose between accounting 
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policies may encourage earnings management and this may mislead investors. 
This means that in the context of Tanzania, regulations need to clearly specify the 
accounting standards that firms have to apply. 
However, the findings of this study should be interpreted in the context of 
the sample size used. A sample size of 60-firm years is too small to provide 
conclusive evidence on Africa. Hence further research is required in other African 
countries with more listed companies on their stock exchanges, for example, 
countries such as Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe. It may also be interesting 
to carry out a cross-country study to determine with accounting policy choice 
differ by country in Africa. Second, because the study uses panel data, with each 
company included five times, the results are affected by the economic changes or 
specific events in a specific year. To the extent that the economic changes or 
events are not controlled for in the model, this is a limitation. Future researchers 
can use cross-sectional data to avoid the economic changes between years, test 
foreign political costs, managers’ discretion, audit committee and industry. 
Moreover, they should try to use natural logarithm of total sales as a measure 
instead of natural logarithm of total assets and investigate relevance of options in 
choosing accounting policies. 
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APPENDIX 1 
List of Companies Listed on DSE and Investigated 
S/N 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
Company Name 
Tol Gases Limited 
Tanzania Breweries Limited 
Tanzania Tea Packers Limited 
Tanzania Cigarette Company Limited 
Tanga Cement Company Limited 
Swissport Tanzania Limited 
Tanzania Portland Cement Company Limited 
National Investment Company Limited 
Dar Es Salaam Community Bank 
National Microfinance Bank Plc 
Kenya Airways Limited 
East African Breweries Limited 
Jubilee Holdings Limited 
Kenya Commercial Bank Limited 
CRDB Bank Public Limited Company 
Symbol 
TOL 
TBL 
TATEPA 
TCC 
SIMBA 
SWISSPORT 
TWIGA 
NICOL 
DCB 
NMB 
KA 
EABL 
JHL 
KCB 
CRDB 
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